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Synthesis

Socio-hydrology: Insights into the Interplay of Engineering Design and Self-organization in a Multi-level World.

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1.

ABSTRACT

2. The emerging field of socio-hydrology is a special case of social-ecological systems research that
3. focuses on coupled human-water systems, exploring how the hydrologic cycle and human cultural traits
4. co-evolve and how such co-evolutions lead to phenomena of relevance to water security and
5. sustainability. As such, most problems tackled by socio-hydrology involve some aspects of
6. engineering design, such as large-scale water infrastructure, and self-organization in a broad
7. context, such as cultural change at the population level and the hydrologic shift at the river basin
8. or aquifer level. However, within the field of socio-hydrology, it has been difficult to find
9. general theories that assist our understanding of the dynamics emerging from the interplay between
10. design and self-organization, hindering generalization of phenomena between cases. This paper
11. addresses this gap by developing insights on how the theoretical frameworks of robustness-fragility
12. tradeoff and cultural multi-level selection can inform our understanding in this regard. We apply
13. the two theories to two cases in the Ganges Brahmaputra Delta in Bangladesh and the Kissimmee River
14. Basin in Florida, illustrating how the two theories may provide general insights into causal
15. mechanisms shaping the socio-hydrological phenomena observed in the two cases. Specifically, we use
16. the two theories to address (1) the transference of system fragility across different domains due to
17. design choices and (2) the multi-level social processes in the nested organizational hierarchy that
18. lead to the formation or collapse of shared cultural traits. We show that these two theories,
19. separately or taken together, can provide richer theoretical grounding for understanding
20. socio-hydrological phenomena.
21. Key words: socio-hydrology; coupled human-water system; robustness-fragility tradeoffs; cultural

22. multi-level selection; robustness; cultural evolution; the levee effect

23. **1. Introduction**

24. The continued surge of interdisciplinary systems approaches to studying environmental and
25. sustainability problems, notably the resilience of social-ecological systems, has highlighted the
26. importance of viewing nature and society as interdependent systems and the tight feedback that
27. connects them (Folke 2016). A similar systems approach, socio-hydrology or coupled human-water
28. systems, has only recently emerged within the discipline of hydrology and water resources, driven by
29. a growing appreciation that many of the serious, recurring problems in water resources use originate
30. from the lack of consideration of the two-way feedback between hydrologic and social systems
31. (Sivapalan et al. 2012). Socio-hydrology is a rapidly growing research area, with a potential to
32. push the field of hydrology beyond its traditional boundaries of focusing solely on hydrologic
33. systems and processes (Konar et al. 2019). A core question in socio-hydrology is whether common
34. phenomena can be identified in disparate cases and how they may be explained by the two-way
35. feedback, thus creating general insights that transcend specific instances (Troy et al. 2015, Di
36. Baldassarre et al. 2019). Several studies explored such phenomena, including tradeoffs between
37. short- and long-term flood vulnerabilities (Di Baldassarre et al. 2013, Merz et al. 2015), the
38. shifting of societal preference about water allocation from economic production to environmental
39. conservation (Van Emmerik et al. 2014, Chen et al. 2016), unintended consequences of improving
40. irrigation efficiency (Scott 2011, Grafton et al. 2018), urban water supply issues in less developed
41. regions (Srinivasan 2015), and unintended consequences from the expansion of and over-reliance on
42. water reservoirs (Di Baldassarre et al. 2018).

43. While building on social-ecology, socio-hydrology studies tend to be differentiated by three
44. distinct features. First, the spatial and time scales of analysis are often at the levels where
45. changes in the hydrologic cycle can be observed and examined. For example, regional spatial extents
46. such as watersheds, river basins, aquifers, and citywide water supply networks are analyzed over a
47. relatively long time scale to track changes in the hydrologic cycle (Zhang et al. 2014, Gunderson et
48. al. 2017). Second, on par with emphasis on the evolution of hydrologic cycle, the field is
49. interested in the evolution of human cultural traits (e.g., social norms, practices, etc.)
50. concerning water and the mechanisms and conditioning factors behind it (Sanderson et al. 2017,
51. Roobavannan et al. 2017). Third, the role of built infrastructure is often explicitly recognized and
52. included in analysis, especially the effects of infrastructure design on the trajectories of
53. human-water interactions (Di Baldassarre et al. 2013, Yu et al. 2015, 2017). Given these features, a
54. systems approach to studying socio-hydrology requires a consideration of how the interplay between
55. design (infrastructure or policy design) and self-organization (hydrological shifts or social

56. change) and generates emergent dynamics. Further, coupled human-water systems tend to contain
57. multiple social units embedded in a nested hierarchy (Gunderson et al. 2017). For example,
58. smallholder households are embedded within irrigation communities, which are embedded within the
59. jurisdictional hierarchies of local, regional, and federal level organizations. Given this
60. multi-level nature, socio-hydrology also requires understanding of how multi-level dynamics in
61. social organizations shape outcomes. It is, therefore, useful to think of coupled human-water
62. systems are part designed and part self-organized systems. In other words, infrastructure or policy
63. designs may be imposed to achieve particular goals, but actual outcomes depend on how the hydrologic
64. cycle shifts or how social processes within and between levels in a nested hierarchy evolve in
65. response to such designs, often in unexpected ways.

66. However, general insights into the causal mechanisms affecting the interplay between design and
67. self-organization and the multi-level nature of social change have been elusive in the field of
68. socio-hydrology. Such insights are critical for improving understanding of how and why coupled
69. human-water systems co-evolve along certain trajectories and why they can be sustainable in certain
70. cases and not others. This paper, therefore, aims to examine how co-evolutionary patterns of
71. socio-hydrology can be examined and linked by applying an overarching theoretical framework.
72. Specifically, we draw on the theories of robustness-fragility tradeoff (RFTO) and cultural
73. multi-level selection (CMLS), two independent approaches that are, together, useful for
74. understanding a wide range of dynamics exhibited by part designed and part self-organized systems.
75. The theory of RFTO presents generalizable insights about how system design altered to enhance
76. robustness in one domain may lead to amplified fragilities in other ways (Csete and Doyle 2002,
77. Anderies 2015). The theory of CMLS, in contrast, explains the cultural change of human societies by
78. identifying cultural transmission and selection processes operating at different levels of
79. organizational hierarchy, and the consequences of these multi-level selection pressures on cultural
80. trait emergence and persistence (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Waring et al. 2015). To illustrate the
81. utility of these two theoretical lenses, we apply them to socio-hydrological phenomena observed in
82. two case areas: community-managed flood protection systems (polders) in southwest Bangladesh and the
83. Kissimmee River Basin, Florida.

84. We examine how the theoretical lenses of RFTO and CMLS can facilitate generalization by applying
85. them to the phenomena of "levee effect" (Montz and Tobin 2008) and "pendulum swing" (Kandasamy et
86. al. 2014), two iconic patterns of socio-hydrology. The levee effect has been the subject of multiple
87. socio-hydrology studies (Di Baldassarre et al. 2013, Viglione et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2017, Sung et
88. al. 2018). According to the levee effect, building higher levees ultimately increases vulnerability
89. to flooding in long run, rather than decreasing it, because short-term stability created by building
90. levees can lead to expansion of practices that increase the costs and risks of rarer long-term

91. disasters. The opposite of the levee effect is referred to as the adaptation effect, which means
92. that allowing moderate exposure to flood events can lead to enhanced social capacity to cope with
93. rare flood disasters in long run (Di Baldassarre et al. 2015). In summary, both effects involve
94. tradeoffs in system fragility between two levels of time scale (frequent vs. rare) and that these
95. tradeoffs arise because of the effects of design choices (infrastructure or policy designs) on the
96. self-organization of flood memory, human settlement pattern, or flood hydrology.

97. The phenomenon of "pendulum swing" has been also studied by multiple socio-hydrology studies
98. (Elshafei et al. 2014, Van Emmerik et al. 2014, Mostert 2017). This phenomenon pertains to the
99. shifting of people's collective preference for allocation of water resources from economic
100. development to environmental health. The current socio-hydrology literature provides only a
101. mechanistic description of the phenomenon at the population level. For example, it relies on
102. metaphors such as collective memory and community sensitivity, which identify a society's shared
103. memory, attitude, or preference toward certain hydrological or environmental conditions. The basic
104. idea is that the state of collective memory or community sensitivity is affected by hydrological
105. events (e.g., flooding), which in turn feeds back to affect hydrology via a social response (e.g.,
106. construction of more levees), leading to altered hydrological processes in the future. Although
107. simple and straightforward, these composite concepts abstract away much of the underlying causal
108. mechanisms of social change. In other words, there is a need to account for how a cultural trait may
109. spread and become widely shared in a society despite diverse traits that may have initially existed
110. at the level of individuals and how such shared norms may become stabilized or collapse and be
111. overtaken by another cultural trait.

112. Producing general insights about multiple socio-hydrological phenomena would thereby require
113. theories that address (1) tradeoffs in system fragility that arise as a result of design choices and
114. the self-organized response of social or hydrological components, and (2) multi-level analysis
115. covering both individual-level cultural variation and selection and population-level cultural
116. dynamics. RFTO and CMLS, two theoretical approaches that are increasingly being used in
117. sustainability studies (Reyes-García et al. 2016, Ishtiaque et al. 2017, Brooks et al. 2018a,
118. Ellis et al. 2018, Tellman et al. 2018), can meet these respective requirements, suggesting the
119. benefits of these theories for addressing socio-hydrological phenomena. Both separately and taken
120. together, we argue that these two theories provide richer theoretical grounding to socio-hydrology.

121. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following two sections, we provide brief
122. introductions to the theories of RFTO and CMLS. In section 4, we discuss the case of a
123. community-managed flood protection system (polder) in southwest Bangladesh. A case-driven model of a
124. polder is then used to illustrate RFTOs and their connections to the levee and adaptation effects.

125. We also use a cultural evolutionary perspective to analyze the emergence and evolution of
126. cooperation in the case. In section 5, we discuss the case of channelization and restoration of the
127. Kissimmee River Basin in Florida over the last 50 years. We use this case to illustrate RFTOs and
128. CMLS, and then discuss how these two theories individually help us understand the co-evolution of
129. human and water systems observed in the basin. In the last two sections, we provide discussion and
130. conclusions on how the two theories complement each other and how their combined use may provide an
131. effective way to interpret socio-hydrological phenomena in general.

132. **2 Robustness-Fragility Tradeoff**

133. According to RFTO, structural modification or fine-tuning of control of complex feedback systems to
134. increase its robustness to one set of disturbances necessarily leads to increased fragilities to
135. disturbances outside that set (Anderies 2015). Such tradeoffs in robustness, or conversely,
136. fragility, is a fundamental property of feedback systems (Bode 1945), and has been labelled the
137. "conservation of fragility" elsewhere (Csete and Doyle 2002). The basic insight is that efforts to
138. enhance robustness often serve merely to move fragilities around to different domains, rather than
139. eliminating them. Such tradeoffs are dangerous because people tend to develop a false sense of
140. security, as emergent fragilities from altering system design are often hidden, and revealed only
141. through catastrophic failures (Anderies 2015).

142. RFTOs have been illustrated in a wide range of controlled systems, from linear feedback systems to
143. complex engineered systems and social-ecological systems. Within the social-ecological systems
144. literature, RFTO theory has been applied primarily to understand how human efforts to cope with
145. environmental variability through the use of built infrastructures, policy actions, or both lead to
146. the shifting of fragility across different scales or levels within a scale (e.g., Ishtiaque et al.
147. 2017, Tellman et al. 2018). RFTO theory has also been discussed in a socio-hydrology context in a
148. recent study (Yu et al. 2017). This study characterized the levee effect as an example of
149. RFTO-induced phenomena by exposing hidden social problems that emerge because of building more flood
150. infrastructure.

151. A typology of RFTO (Figure 1) has been proposed to help conceptualize how such tradeoffs occur in a
152. social-ecological system context (Anderies 2015). Four basic types of RFTOs can exist according to
153. this typology: structural RFTO, network RFTO, feedback RFTO, and feedback and structural RFTO.
154. Structural RFTO represents a direct modification to the system structure, e.g., converting a natural
155. floodplain to a semi-engineered environment by the construction of levees (Figure 1A). Such
156. modifications help to suppress short-term environmental variability (e.g., daily tidal inundation),
157. but also tend to be associated with increased fragilities at a different level of the time scale,
158. such as catastrophic outcomes when a 500-year flood occurs, or on altogether different scale, such

159. as free-riding behaviors of people regarding infrastructure maintenance. By contrast, network RFTO
160. represents an insertion of an exchange network among multiple "source" systems, whose outputs or
161. benefit flows respond differently (or do not co-vary in time) to a disturbance, and a "sink" system
162. that taps into these benefit flows. Such an exchange network helps to reduce the effects of
163. short-term fluctuations in the source side on the sink side because of an insurance effect, i.e.,
164. even if one of source systems cannot withstand a disturbance and fails to perform, other source
165. systems that have the same function may withstand it and still allow the sink system to receive
166. benefit flows (Figure 1B). However, the connection to the larger network and the resultant
167. interdependencies (where outputs of one node becomes inputs to another node) may exacerbate the risk
168. of cascading failures triggered by a node failure in the network.

169. Feedback RFTO represents an introduction of feedback "control" response to variations in a system
170. state to achieve stability (Figure 1C). Such feedback controls are often dictated by some existing
171. management policy or regulatory protocols. For example, dam or reservoir operations can be guided by
172. pre-existing operation rules that have been based on historical streamflow trends. However, when the
173. streamflow pattern deviates significantly from the historical trend, conforming to these existing
174. operation rules might worsen outcomes. Finally, structural and feedback RFTO occurs when both
175. infrastructure modification (e.g., altering the design of flood protection infrastructure) and
176. feedback control (e.g., dynamically adjusting reservoir water levels) occur to achieve stability
177. (Figure 1D). This form of system control is extremely powerful, and the system appears to be highly
178. robust because of the combined effects of engineering design and feedback-driven regulatory control.
179. However, it is also the most problematic because fragilities are hidden by the very power of
180. structural changes and feedback controls and are revealed only because of rare catastrophic
181. failures. Self-organization is behind the manifestation of most of these fragilities: from
182. development of a false sense of security among people and the resulting shifts in their collective
183. memory and land use patterns, to gradual shifts in natural system states and processes.

184. *Figure 1 about here*

185. **3 Cultural Evolution and Cultural Multi-Level Selection**

186. Social change, or shifts in the frequencies of cultural traits within populations, is an integral
187. part of socio-hydrology, and is regarded as endogenous to coupled human-water systems dynamics
188. (Sivapalan et al. 2012, Montanari et al. 2013). The question of how to theorize and model social
189. change, and its two-way connection with hydrological processes, has garnered much interest and
190. debate recently among hydrologists and water resources researchers (Gober and Wheeler 2015, Loucks
191. 2015, Yu et al. 2017, Roobavannan et al. 2017). We argue that the broader theory of cultural
192. evolution and cultural multi-level selection (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Brooks et al. 2018b) already

193. provides excellent conceptual tools for understanding social change in this regard.

194. According to the dual-inheritance theory of cultural evolution (Richerson and Boyd 2005),
195. individuals inherit traits culturally, through social learning, in addition to genetically, through
196. reproduction. This cultural form of inheritance then gives rise to a distinct, non-genetic process
197. of Darwinian selection (cultural selection), which can be modeled according to the same principles
198. that biologists use to track relative frequencies among genetic traits over time. In this approach,
199. cultural traits are defined as information, values, skills or practices that individuals acquire
200. specifically through social learning. And just as functional complexity accumulates over time among
201. genetically inherited traits, so too does it accumulate in cultural traits, as we see in the
202. accumulation of knowledge in science and technology, and in the complexity of social rules, norms,
203. and practices involved in the management and use of natural resources (e.g., Ostrom 1990).
204. Understanding the dynamics of cultural evolution is important to socio-hydrology because cultural
205. traits strongly shape human interactions both with one another and with the environment and thus
206. outcomes of human-water interactions in long run. One way or another, any theory capable of tracking
207. and explaining social change will have to address underlying cultural processes that give rise to
208. regularities in cultural traits among individuals.

209. Cultural selection, the cultural equivalent of Darwinian natural selection, occurs when a particular
210. cultural trait is transmitted in a population at the expense of others because of its effect on
211. individuals who use it in a given context (Mesoudi et al. 2006). For example, an individually-costly
212. water conservation practice, like converting a lawn to a xeriscape, may be selected and persist in a
213. society either because of formal incentives and regulations, or because of informal sanctions of
214. peer pressure, reputation and social comparison, or because individuals have personally internalized
215. norms of conservation. But whatever the nature of the particular cultural selection pressures
216. involved, they will depend on the particular cultural context, or the contingent history of shared
217. beliefs and values that either promote or discourage the uptake of various practices. Thus, for
218. example, when pre-existing rules and norms in a city favor structural measures of flood protection,
219. an alternative norm for non-structural forms of flood protection cannot easily invade and spread.

220. As these examples suggest, cultural traits can be transmitted vertically across generations, as
221. children inherit the culture of their genetic parents, as well as horizontally, among peers of the
222. same age or generation (Figure 2A). In cases of horizontal transmission, learning strategies include
223. conformist learning biases, in which individuals disproportionately copy the majority behavior, and
224. success-biased learning, in which individuals preferentially copy other successful individuals. A
225. shared cultural trait is formed when such learning strategies used by numerous individuals give rise
226. to regularities in social rules, beliefs, values, or practices in a social group. Once established,

227 . a cultural trait can be further reinforced and stabilized through social effects such as peer
228 . pressure and group selection (Figure 2C) (Chudek et al. 2013). Alternatively, perturbations such as
229 . innovations, or cultural mutations, may disrupt an existing equilibrium (Figure 2B). The theory of
230 . cultural evolution, therefore, provides a powerful set of ideas explaining both the emergence and
231 . stability of cultural traits over time, including those that influence the use and management of
232 . water resources.

233 . *Figure 2 about here*

234 . It is critical to note that cultural selection can occur at multiple levels of the social
235 . organization (Richerson et al. 2014). Just as cultural traits can spread among individuals via
236 . social learning, so can they spread among groups of individuals, if the dominant level of selection
237 . is at the group level. This process of cultural selection at multiple levels is termed cultural
238 . multilevel selection (CMLS) (Wilson and Kniffin 1997, Wilson et al. 2013). Waring et al. (2015)
239 . recently applied CMLS to social-ecological systems in the context of collective action problems in
240 . order to study the evolution of cooperative cultural traits within social groups. The force of
241 . cultural selection on a focal cultural trait can vary across different levels of social organization
242 . (individual vs. group) (Richerson et al. 2014). For example, a water conservation norm might replace
243 . a wasteful norm to achieve the common goal of water sustainability, if groups who adopt water
244 . conservation are more successful than those that do not. Whether or not this occurs, however, likely
245 . depends on the level of the social organization scale at which cultural selection is the strongest
246 . (Figure 3). When water is abundant, and thus enforcement is weak, cultural selection would be
247 . dominant at the level of individuals and collective action for voluntary water conservation would
248 . likely fail. However, when water is scarce, water rates are high, and the government provides
249 . financial incentives to groups that achieve higher water conservation, cultural selection would be
250 . dominant at the group level (i.e., group selection). In this scenario, a group-benefiting cultural
251 . trait would proliferate through mechanisms such as peer pressure and group competition. In reality,
252 . selection pressures occur at multiple levels in several connected social groups: an individualistic
253 . trait may prevail in some groups due to their unique physical or social context, while individuals
254 . in other groups may be driven more by peer pressure and group competition and adopt a
255 . group-benefiting trait.

256 . *Figure 3 about here*

257 . **4 Polders in Southwest Bangladesh**

258 . Hydrological variability and associated events such as riverine flooding adversely impact human
259 . livelihood. Thus, in many human-flood systems, build infrastructures such as levees and upstream

260. dams are constructed to contain and smooth out hydrological variability. The frequency of flooding
261. is dramatically reduced, and hydrological dynamics are largely unnoticed as a result. However, each
262. flood that is contained is a loss of opportunity for social learning, and the absence of people's
263. earlier exposure to such actual flooding experiences and learning opportunities may lead to a
264. serious reduction, or loss, of local flood response capacity to be able to cope effectively with
265. rarer disasters (Liao 2012). This phenomenon, referred to as the levee effect (Montz and Tobin
266. 2008), is increasingly being observed worldwide (Di Baldassarre et al. 2015). Here, we use the case
267. of polders in Southwest Bangladesh to illustrate how RFTO and CMLS can be used to interpret the
268. levee and adaptation effects.

269. *4.1 Background*

270. The coastal region of southwest Bangladesh is characterized by deltaic floodplains of the Ganges and
271. Brahmaputra Rivers. This region is regularly exposed to flood-related natural hazards (Brammer 2010,
272. Auerbach et al. 2015). Before the British colonization in the 18th century, much of the region was a
273. forested with little human intervention. People depended on forest resources, inshore fishing, and
274. small-scale agriculture for living. Extensive agriculture was impossible because the area's
275. low-lying lands were exposed to seawater inundation twice a day. With the British colonization,
276. however, major changes to land-use and livelihood took place (Ishtiaque et al. 2017). Landlords
277. cleared large tracts of forest lands and leased them for farming. Population size increased and
278. farmers constructed pockets of small earthen levees with the support of landlords. Although the
279. earthen levees provided some protection against saline water intrusion, the region and the
280. communities within it were still exposed to rare floods caused by major weather events, such as
281. tropical cyclones. There was little or no sign of major collective action for flood protection
282. during this period, for instance via voluntary contributions to support large-scale infrastructure.

283. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Bangladesh government initiated the Coastal Embankment Project
284. to suppress flood risk and to increase agricultural productivity in the region. Multi-lateral
285. agencies supported the project. This project led to the construction of 37 polders in the country's
286. southwest region, encompassing 1556 km of levees (or embankments) designed to protect low-lying
287. lands from riverine flooding and storm surge (Dewan et al. 2015). A polder is an engineered
288. hydrological unit that surrounds a tract of floodplain enclosed by embankments and sluice gates
289. (Figure 4A). Embankments protect the area inside from flooding. Sluice gates are used to exchange
290. water with surrounding bodies of water. Two major changes took place because of the project. First,
291. with the enhanced flood protection, extensive agriculture and aquaculture became widespread (Swapan
292. and Gavin 2011, Amoako Johnson et al. 2016). This led to increased population and increased land use
293. for economic production. Second, the presence of shared polder infrastructure required involvement

294. or collective action of local communities to maintain the infrastructure (Sultana and Thompson 2010,
295. 2017). Because insufficient or delayed support from the central government is common in this region,
296. the local residents have no choice but to initiate effort to engage in such maintenance activities.
297. Collective action tends to occur in two forms: in normal situations, people need to work together
298. periodically to counter the natural erosion of embankments, while in emergency, people must work
299. together to address breakdowns of embankments that randomly occur when storm surges hit the coasts.
300. Indeed, local communities tend to have strong social norms, which effectively suppress free riding,
301. for collective maintenance of the polders (Afroz et al. 2016).

302. The construction of the polders has led to improved protection against more regular floods. However,
303. as indicated by the great losses suffered from the Great Bhola Cyclone of 1970, which included the
304. deaths of more than 250,000 people, the region is still vulnerable to rare but acute floods (Hossain
305. et al. 2008). In fact, due to increased population size and economic activity in the polders,
306. combined with the deteriorating quality of polder infrastructure, the region probably has developed
307. increased fragility to rare floods.

308. *4.2 RFTO analysis*

309. We use the stylized model of collective management of a polder in southwest Bangladesh developed by
310. Yu et al. (2017) to illustrate how RFTO can be used to interpret the levee and adaptation effects.
311. The model was developed to understand critical general features that affect the long-term resilience
312. of coastal communities in the region. Two model elements are key drivers of human-flood interaction
313. in the model system: polder infrastructure and collective action for polder maintenance. Polder
314. infrastructure protects residents from flooding. The level of flood protection provided by
315. embankment height, however, can decline over time through natural erosion or breaches caused by
316. storm surges. The model assumes that the residents share a collective goal to maintain a
317. pre-determined level of flood protection through regular maintenance. Individuals can choose from
318. two behavioral strategies about this social goal: contribute to community-organized maintenance work
319. (cooperators) and free-ride without contribution (defectors). In each time step, an individual
320. chooses the strategy that gives a higher expected payoff. Strategy payoff is comprised of monetary
321. and non-monetary portions. Monetary payoff is determined by flood damage, agricultural yield, and
322. the cost of polder maintenance. Non-monetary payoff is determined by the penalty accruing to
323. defectors in the form of social ostracism and the cost of sanctioning borne by cooperators.

324. Two model processes are especially important here. First, more flood protection is associated with
325. more costly infrastructure maintenance and reduced flood exposure. Second, a lack of exposure to
326. flooding can lead to reduced ostracism of defectors because there is less awareness of flood risk.
327. The conceptual model used in this study captures these social and hydrological processes and shows

328. how outcomes such as agricultural yield and level of collective action (percentage of cooperators)
329. change over time. The model results suggest that allowing some hydrological variability to enter
330. into the polder can increase the community resilience through the preservation of social norm for
331. collective action. More detailed description of the model can be found in the work of Yu et al.
332. (2017).

333. A set of model outputs illustrates the levee effect in our model simulations. Greater flood
334. protection reduces the occurrence of flooding (which happens when water level is higher than the
335. embankment level) in the early stages of the simulations (Figure 3D). This signifies enhanced
336. robustness to frequent, regular floods. This success, however, leads to an increase in fragility to
337. the collective action problem of infrastructure maintenance because the defector strategy can more
338. easily spread due to a lack of flood exposure and a higher cost of maintenance (Figures 4E). As
339. such, when a rarer flood that calls for greater collective action occurs, the model system
340. collapses. In short, there is a tradeoff in robustness or conservation of fragility between frequent
341. floods and rarer floods, which is mediated by the collective action problem of maintaining the
342. infrastructure. The case thus fits the conditions described by RFTO theory. More specifically, based
343. on the RFTO typology shown in Figure 1, the levee effect can be interpreted as a case of structural
344. and feedback RFTO (Figure 1D), because of the presence of structural modification (embankments) and
345. the associated feedback-driven social actions to maintain the embankment level to a pre-determined
346. level. It is worth mentioning that the levee effect is also concordant with a concept in resilience
347. thinking referred to as "specified resilience," which is akin to RFTO. Specified resilience is about
348. "resilience of what to what and for whom" (Carpenter et al. 2001, Lebel et al. 2006). Just as
349. tradeoffs in robustness are predicted by RFTO theory, resilience theorists have suggested that
350. enhancing specified resilience to one kind of disturbance regime may often come at the expense of
351. reducing specified resilience to other disturbance regimes (Folke 2016).

352. RFTO also provides a theoretical grounding for the adaptation effect. A moderate level of flood
353. protection, which occasionally allows flooding, appears to be less robust to flood events and more
354. sensitive to agricultural yields in the early stage of simulations (Figure 4B). This deliberate
355. allowance of flooding, however, helps to preserve the shared awareness of flood risk and the social
356. norm for collective action within the model community, leading to an increase in robustness to rarer
357. flooding (Figures 4C). Thus, the notion of the conservation of fragility also applies to this
358. pattern. Since frequent, regular flooding is not overly suppressed in this case, the total amount of
359. fragility is conserved by not amplifying fragility to another disturbance regime (i.e., rarer
360. flooding). In summary, RFTO provides a generalized viewpoint to understanding the levee and
361. adaptation effects, regardless of where they occur or what specific forms of fragility are involved.

362. *Figure 4 about here*

363. *4.3 CMLS analysis*

364. CMLS theory provides another lens with which to understand human-flood interactions in southwest
365. Bangladesh. In this region, the hierarchy of social organization is generally divided into three
366. levels: individual, community (polder), and the government. Prior to the Coastal Embankment Project,
367. there was no significant group-level organization at all with regard to practices of flood
368. prevention, so selection among the relevant cultural traits could only have occurred at the level of
369. individuals. At that time, the dominant level of selection was probably the individuals (the 1st
370. column in Figure 5). Farmers who did a better job maintaining small-scale levees for their own
371. farmlands would have been more successful, and effective individual-level coping strategies to
372. floods might have spread among farmers via cultural evolution, for example, if farmers imitated
373. other successful farmers. This is an instance of the adaptation effect occurring at the individual
374. level. Even after British colonization, the dominant level of selection remained the same because
375. landlords and farmers still had to manage and build small-scale levees for their own farmlands.
376. Group-beneficial or collective behaviors did not immediately follow colonization. However,
377. continuous floods were a significant problem for landlords and farmers as they looked to cultivate
378. crops on a larger scale. Flood coping activities at the level of individuals were not nearly enough
379. to support large-scale, extensive agriculture in the low-lying floodplains.

380. To encourage productivity on a larger scale, and increase cultural fitness of nation as a whole, the
381. Bangladesh government implemented the Coastal Embankment Project, which constructed embankments
382. (polders) around low-lying lands on floodplains (the 2nd column in Figure 5). However, a lack of
383. government support for polder maintenance led to selection occurring at the community level (the 3rd
384. column in Figure 5). In the absence of top-down incentives or enforcement from the government,
385. residents confronted a collective action problem regarding the maintenance of the polders.
386. Individuals who could have spent their time farming, or engaging in other activities that would have
387. been more profitable to them, began to act instead for the group's interest by participating in
388. polder maintenance. As in other cases in which cultural selection is shifted from competition among
389. traits of individuals to traits of groups, culturally learned norms imposed reputation-based costs
390. that countered the benefits of selfish actions (the 4th column in Figure 5). This enabled residents
391. along the Bangladesh coast to cooperate with their neighbors for the benefit of the community, in
392. spite of the temptation to act for their own individual benefit instead. Simultaneously, effective
393. norms of polder maintenance most likely spread among communities through knowledge transfer, in a
394. form of group-level, success-biased social learning. Both mechanisms provide a plausible pathway
395. through which culturally inherited traits that contribute to flood protection came to be what they

396. are. This is an instance of the adaptation effect occurring at the group level because community
397. adaptive capacity is reinforced through frequent exposure to the collective action problem of polder
398. maintenance, which, if unresolved, threatens people's livelihoods.

399. Without effective government incentives or enforcement, which restrain the behavioral choices of
400. individuals, social learning and polder maintenance cost per household probably became critical
401. features that enable community sustainability and extensive agriculture. Further, the region is and
402. will be increasingly exposed to flood risks from human-induced sinking of delta lands and extreme
403. weather events. Thus, the coupled human-water systems in the region are at the crossroads of
404. pursuing more techno-centric solutions versus learning to live with floods. The techno-centric
405. approach of continuous levee heightening can lead to a greater decay of flood memory (due to lack of
406. people's exposure to regular floods and lost opportunities for social learning) and an increase in
407. per household cost for polder maintenance. In such cases, the dominant level of selection will
408. likely shift from community to individuals and make collective action difficult. This hypothetical
409. scenario is an instance of the levee effect, i.e., over-dependence on the polder infrastructure
410. leading to an erosion of community adaptive capacity.

411. *Figure 5 about here*

412. **5 Channelization and Restoration in the Kissimmee River Basin, Florida**

413. In socio-hydrology, the metaphor of a swinging pendulum has been used to conceptualize shifts in a
414. society's preferences for water allocation between emphasizing development and economic gain, on one
415. hand, and environmental protection and restoration, on the other. A key construct used to model such
416. swings is that of "community sensitivity" to environmental health (Elshafei et al. 2015, Mostert
417. 2017). The state of community sensitivity is assumed to be affected by some hydrological event
418. (e.g., flood damages), which in turn feeds back to affect behavioral responses (e.g., building
419. higher levees). Community sensitivity to environmental concerns is decreased when flooding occurs,
420. and sensitivity becomes progressively lower, a society prefers more development and control of water
421. resources for stability and economic gain. In contrast, when environmental degradation occurs,
422. because of the development and control of water resources, community sensitivity to environmental
423. health is increased. Here, we use the case of channelization and restoration in the Kissimmee River
424. basin to illustrate how RFTO and CMLS can aid our interpretation of such swings in social
425. preference.

426. *5.1 Background*

427. The Kissimmee River basin lies in central Florida, extending from the south side of Orlando to Lake

428. Okeechobee. This river basin was channelized in the 1960s, as the pendulum swung in the direction of
429. economic development, but the channelization was later reversed in 1990s, as the pendulum swung in
430. the other direction. Here, the upstream and downstream regions are characterized by different social
431. and natural environments. Urban communities are found in the upstream region, and since most urban
432. residents live far away from the river corridor, floods are not a primary issue. In contrast, most
433. of the downstream residents depend on agriculture for their livelihood, and since most of their
434. farmlands are located on floodplains, their livelihoods are sensitive to flooding. Over the past
435. several decades, the population in the upstream region has increased substantially, while the
436. downstream population has increased only slightly (Chen et al. 2016). Hurricanes have periodically
437. caused more agricultural damage in the downstream region. For example, the two consecutive hurricane
438. events of 1947 destroyed much of the agriculture in the downstream area (Koebel 1995). Indeed, this
439. agricultural vulnerability provided the initial impetus for residents to petition the government for
440. hydrological intervention (Chen et al. 2016).

441. In response to the residents' request, the US government commissioned the U.S. Army Corps of
442. Engineers to initiate the Kissimmee River Channelization Project, which was implemented between 1962
443. and 1971. This project transformed the natural winding river to a man-made straightened canal that
444. is 90 km in length. As intended, the channelization effectively reduced flooding in the downstream
445. region by suppressing runoff fluctuations. This success, however, created a new problem-wetland loss
446. in the downstream areas (Toth et al. 1995). The wetlands in the region gradually dried out because
447. water runoff was cut short by the channelized river. The region's wetlands shrunk in size by
448. approximately 120 km², which equates to about 70 percent of the original wetland area. This
449. consequently resulted in a serious loss of biodiversity in the region (Koebel and Bousquin 2014).
450. This destruction of the wetland ecosystem greatly concerned urban residents in the upstream region,
451. who had greater population size, and thus greater political influence than downstream residents.
452. Upstream residents actively voiced their concerns to the government, and sought to reverse the loss
453. of the wetlands, ultimately resulting in the authorization of the Kissimmee River Restoration Act by
454. the federal and state government (Chen et al. 2016).

455. The restoration project began in 1999 and is expected to be completed by 2019. To minimize the loss
456. flood control provided by the channels, only the midstream section of channels was removed and
457. returned to its past natural conditions. Simultaneously, lands near the river were bought out by the
458. government and restored to floodplains to provide "room for river". As the floodplains store a great
459. amount of water, this kind of green infrastructure provides a buffer against flood waters, while
460. also restoring the wetland ecosystem. In the final analysis, the restoration project has increased
461. the risk of downstream floods, but this increased risk is estimated to be acceptable for
462. agricultural purposes (Bousquin et al. 2009).

463. *5.2 RFTO analysis*

464. We can use an RFTO lens to identify shifts in system fragility as the region's coupled human-water
465. system went from channelization to restoration of the Kissimmee River Basin. Chen et al. (2016)
466. designed a stylized model of the case to capture the shifts in built infrastructure and their
467. impacts, noting that the channelization project and the restoration project targeted different
468. domains of disturbance. According to RFTO, the coupled system cannot be perfectly robust to all
469. disturbances at different domains. The channelization was done mainly to increase the robustness of
470. agriculture to floods, whereas the restoration project primarily aimed to reduce the vulnerability
471. of biodiversity and wetland ecosystem health to altered hydrological regime. Both structural
472. changes, mainly driven by the conflicting cultural concerns of upstream and downstream residents,
473. can be interpreted as a case of structural RFTI (Figure 1A). But the resulting changes of
474. hydrological and natural systems are fed back to influence cultural concerns of the residents,
475. resulting in feedback running in both directions between human systems and water systems.

476. Channelization, the goal of which was to enhance robustness to floods, initially performed well.
477. Reduced flood intensity and variance limited damage to crops of downstream farmers. However, this
478. improvement to hard infrastructure did not eliminate fragility but actually moved it to a different
479. domain (from flooding to loss of biodiversity). Despite robust protection against floods, wetland
480. health problems arose, creating a new threat to the sustainability of the coupled human-water system
481. in the region. The channelization was an adequate solution with regards to flood protection but had
482. an adverse impact with regards to wetland biodiversity. The government and society perceived this
483. emergent vulnerability only after the degradation of the wetlands and thus started a restoration
484. project in the Kissimmee River Basin to recover already diminished wetlands. The restoration
485. project, while still ongoing, has recovered substantial wetland habitat that was destroyed by the
486. channelization. In the course of restoration, however, the government considered both flood
487. protection and the area's ecological health. While some amount of flood risk is inevitable now in
488. the downstream region, it is limited to an acceptable level. The wetlands, meanwhile, have improved
489. substantially, recovering almost back to the original level. In summary, application of RFTO to the
490. case helps an analyst to think about potential fragility tradeoffs across entirely different domains
491. or scales (floods vs. biodiversity), as opposed to across different levels of a scale (frequent vs.
492. rare floods), that arise as a result of structural changes.

493. *5.3 CMLS analysis*

494. Cultural evolution and the CMLS theory help us interpret the multi-level social changes that likely
495. have occurred in the Kissimmee River Basin, which are primarily due to the regional conflict in
496. cultural values between downstream residents, who are less concerned with protecting the

497. environmental, and upstream residents, who are more concerned. Chen et al. (2016) captured these
498. changing norms over time using the composite variable of community sensitivity, but CMLS allows us
499. to understand the detailed dynamics driving community sensitivity at multiple levels of social
500. organization, including the individual, community (upstream and downstream), and federal levels.

501. Downstream residents have historically attempted to protect their farmlands from intensive floods
502. because their crop yields are a direct function of flood damage. Floods thus serve as a powerful
503. source of selection acting on farmers' preferences regarding flood protection. When destructive
504. hurricanes in 1947 devastated crops, concerns about flooding spread rapidly through the population
505. of downstream residents. These regional floods effectively shifted selection to the group level, as
506. individual downstream residents were unable to protect themselves from floods without organizing
507. collective action and making their voice heard to bringing about government intervention (the 2nd
508. column in Figure 6). Yet at a higher level of organization, the group of downstream residents also
509. had to compete with the group of upstream residents, who were not overly concerned about floods.
510. Initially, downstream residents won this competition, because preferences for wetland conservation
511. had not yet evolved. The overall frequency of preferences in the combined population thus favored
512. increased flood protection, and at the federal level, the group acted to channelize the river (the
513. 3rd column in Figure 6).

514. The channelization successfully protected farmlands by decreasing the intensity and variance of
515. floods, but the resulting decline in wetlands resulted in the emergence of a new set of preferences
516. among upstream residents, in virtue of a cultural norm favoring environmental protection. Among
517. upstream communities, this norm-based preference was not constrained by the realities of
518. agricultural flood protection. Downstream farmers, meanwhile, were still worried about flood damage
519. to their farmlands. Due to the rapid population growth in the upstream region, however, preferences
520. for wetland protection among upstream residents became more dominant in the general population
521. overall than preferences for flood protection (the 4th column in Figure 6). As a result, the
522. downstream group now lost the competition with the upstream group, the pendulum swung back in the
523. direction of community sensitivity to the environment, and the government intervened to reverse the
524. previous channelization project (the 5th column in Figure 6).

525. In summary, cultural evolution and CMLS theory help an analyst to account for the changing cultural
526. norms over time in the Kissimmee River basin by illuminating multi-level processes that underlie
527. community sensitivity. Instead of relying on the concept of community sensitivity itself to describe
528. an important social change (e.g., Chen et al. 2016), and thereby abstracting away from processes
529. about why and how the relevant frequencies of individual preferences changed as they did, an
530. analysis based on CMLS is capable of providing causal pathways through which these frequency

531. changes, in terms of fundamental principles of cultural selection acting on different types of
532. preferences within groups arising at different levels of social organization. Figure 5 illustrates
533. our analysis, again employing the organizational levels of individual, community (upstream vs.
534. downstream) and federal.

535. *Figure 6 about here*

536. **6 Discussion: Complementarity of RFTO and CMLS**

537. Socio-hydrology, or the study of coupled human-water system, is a research field still in its
538. infancy, with much to be clarified. As such, the field still leaves room for further improvement
539. from more perspectives that are theoretical. In particular, we argue that coupled human-water
540. systems are part designed and part self-organized in nature and, thus, are in need of theoretical
541. perspectives that assist our understanding of how the interplay between design and self-organization
542. shapes emergent dynamics. A lack of unifying theoretical frameworks hinders the generalization of
543. results between cases, as has been lamented in the related field of sustainability science (Levin
544. and Clark 2010).

545. We have shown that theoretical cross-fertilization can overcome the generalizability problem in the
546. coupled human-water systems of southwest Bangladesh and Kissimmee River Basin, Florida.
547. Specifically, we have shown that the theories of RFTO and CMLS already provide excellent conceptual
548. tools for linking and understanding the phenomena of the levee effect and pendulum swing in these
549. two case areas. This generalization exercise has yielded some interesting comparisons. Both areas
550. display significant built infrastructure developments: mega-scale embankments in coastal Bangladesh
551. and the Kissimmee River channelization. Both regions also display a latter change in which built
552. infrastructure is removed (Kissimmee River Basin) or is faced with maintenance problem (coastal
553. Bangladesh). Moreover, both regions display changes in the level of social decision-making over
554. time.

555. More importantly, RFTO and CMLS are complementary, rather than competing, in assisting our
556. understanding of the phenomena. RFTO theory explains how over-all system changes, including
557. structural modifications such as the construction of embankments or channels, can generate hidden
558. endogenous risks. Built infrastructure is especially prominent in human-water relationships (Di
559. Baldassarre et al. 2015), and thus important in socio-hydrology. This theory exposes an illusion of
560. robustness from hard infrastructure improvement and can help identify potential dangers for system
561. sustainability. The CMLS theory, meanwhile, concerns how human cultural dynamics can act as an
562. endogenous driver of system change (Waring et al. 2015), a major challenge in theories of
563. sustainability (Caldas et al. 2015). This perspective can strengthen our understanding of how human

564. water management systems evolve. The key predictive mechanism of CMLS theory is that within a
565. hierarchically organized society, the level of social organization at which environmental
566. adaptations will emerge is the level that experiences the strongest evolutionary pressures for
567. environmental management. Because modern societies have a nested structure of social organizations
568. (Gowdy and Krall 2015), this insight is globally applicable. In addition, these two theory sets have
569. one other important commonality; both CMLS and RFTO propose endogenous factors to help explain
570. coupled human-water system dynamics. CMLS explains endogenous cultural adaptation to the environment
571. as a result of social and environmental pressures and RFTO explains endogenous systemic weaknesses
572. that arise as a result of fine-tuning of system designs. We believe that this endogeneity gives each
573. theory extra value in understanding the socio-hydrological phenomena.

574. Applying two theories has gained us a few key benefits. From an RFTO perspective, structural
575. modifications that seem to enhance the robustness of the present coupled human-water system may also
576. generate concealed fragilities in other domains. When these fragilities are exposed to people, they
577. abruptly bring failures of systems. Linking infrastructure alteration with human-water interactions
578. in an RFTO concept, the theory assist our interpretation of the levee and adaptation effects. On the
579. other hand, CMLS theory provided a way to identify the social factors that drive changes in system
580. management by focusing on forces that enable individuals to act in individual or in the collective
581. interest. For example, when the dominant level of cultural selection changes, we observed that major
582. infrastructure projects were either undertaken or abandoned. Based upon this comparative exercise,
583. we suggest that combining theories to suit a given case study may be an effective way to study and
584. interpret coupled human-water systems. In the case of Bangladesh, for example, the RFTO theory does
585. not sufficiently account for multi-level social processes that shaped infrastructure design choices,
586. but CMLS theory clarify how social processes (e.g. collective action and social learning) influenced
587. the engineering design choices and system stability after the design implementations. In the case of
588. the Kissimmee River Basin, CMLS provides a more satisfying account of the shifting of people's
589. collective preference for water resources allocation and accompanying social decision-making on
590. engineering design by describing how social processes within and between levels in a nested
591. hierarchy evolve in response to changing circumstances. However, CMLS does not clearly delineate how
592. these multi-level social processes might transfer fragilities to other scales or levels within a
593. scale, an aspect that is well addressed by RFTO

594. **7 Conclusions**

595. Socio-hydrology is a special case of social-ecological systems research with an explicit focus on
596. water and coupled human-water system dynamics. Although coupled human-water systems tend to contain
597. both designed and self-organized components, theoretical frameworks that assist our understanding of

598. the interplay between design and self-organization have been elusive. We argue that this is
599. particularly the case for emergent tradeoffs in system fragility that arise because of design
600. choices and how social processes within and between the levels of organizational hierarchy influence
601. and are influenced by such design choices. Thus, our goal here has been to contribute to addressing
602. this gap by applying and developing insights on how the theoretical frameworks of
603. robustness-fragility tradeoff (RFTO) and cultural multi-level selection (CMLS) can be effective in
604. this regard. We have done so by showing how RFTO and CMLS can be applied to the levee effect and the
605. pendulum swing cases in southwest Bangladesh and central Florida, respectively.

606. A single theory is limited in its demonstration of the complex nature of coupled human-water
607. systems, but combined, theories such as RFTO and CMLS can complement each other, connecting
608. discontinuous stories and enriching the field of socio-hydrology with generalized interpretations.
609. In this way, we will be able to better identify and analyze causal relationships of historical
610. events involved with water issues. This is not to say that place-based studies are less important.
611. By reflecting the unique contexts of a place and its water history, place-based studies of coupled
612. human-water systems can be valuable for generating rich context-specific understanding. However,
613. from a long-term, systems thinking perspective, we argue that such place-based studies often exhibit
614. recurring features that call for generalization. Combining general theories that address the part
615. designed and part self-organized nature of coupled human-water systems can be effective in
616. illuminating such common aspects across different place-based studies. Furthermore, generalized
617. information from combined theories will not only broaden our insight into human-water co-evolution
618. of the past but also help us cope with water sustainability crises in the future. Generalization
619. from theories in combination can facilitate a more comprehensive analysis with long-term systems
620. perspectives for the future water management. That is, it will be possible for policy makers to
621. grasp complex interrelations among human behavior, water resources, governance arrangements, and
622. built infrastructure, guided by synergistic insights from combined theories. This will help them
623. implement policies and engineering designs that contribute towards water security and sustainability
624. in long run.

625.

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Fig. 1. Figure 1. A typology of robustness-fragility tradeoff (RFTO). (A) Structural RFTO represents a direct modification to a resource system structure (e.g., the construction of levees, dams, or irrigation canals) to reduce variability in a system output (e.g., water availability, flood risk, etc.). (B) Network RFTO. Two “source” resource systems whose outputs or benefit flows do not co-vary under a disturbance and a “sink” consumer system are connected through an exchange network. This exchange network reduces variability in the combined benefit flows to the sink system. (C). Feedback RFTO represents an insertion of feedback responses (e.g., control actions guided by pre-existing policies) to variations in a system state to achieve stability. (D) Structural and feedback RFTO combines structural RFTO and feedback RFTO, i.e., system structure is modified, and feedback responses are generated simultaneously. Adapted from Anderies (2015).




Fig. 2. Figure 2. traits through cultural selection. (b) A cultural trait (norm C) is unstable, being overrun by a mutant trait (norm A). (c) A cultural trait (norm C) is stable, resisting invasion by a horizontally transmitted mutant (norm A).




Fig. 3. An illustration of the cultural multi-level selection (CMLS) framework. Cultural selection can occur at multiple levels (individual, group, or both). When cultural selection is stronger at the group level, a group-benefiting cultural trait proliferates. When selection is stronger at the individual level, an individualistic trait is favored and spreads. Adapted from Waring et al. (2015).




Fig. 4. (a) A conceptual cross-section view of polders. (b-c) A scenario of moderate flood protection level. The dynamics of three variables are traced over time under this scenario: peak water surge level (W), embankment height (K), and percentage of cooperators (X). This scenario shows that allowing moderate exposure to flooding can help maintain the community norm for collective action. (d-e) A scenario of high flood protection level. The dynamics of W , K , and X under this scenario show that the suppression of hydrological variability and the lost opportunities for social learning can cause the community norm to decay and eventually collapse. Adapted from Yu et al. (2017).




Fig. 5. A CMLS-style diagram of the levee and adaptation effects in the Bangladesh coast. Shaded boxes indicate the dominant level of selection. (+) signifies much improved prospect for extensive agriculture because of some actions taken at a particular level of organizational hierarchy; (-) signifies insignificant or negative effects on the prospect of extensive agriculture because of some actions taken at a particular level of organizational hierarchy; (↑) signifies collective action; and (↓) signifies positive effects of group norm on individuals' participation in collective action. In the second column, farmers only protected their farmlands, which made large-scale extensive agriculture difficult. In the third column, group level selection occurred, in the form of intervention by national government, which produced a large-scale flood protection infrastructure that enabled extensive agriculture. In the fourth column, however, the government failed to provide ongoing maintenance of this hard infrastructure, causing group-level selection to act at the community level, through informal norms, rather than through formal laws and policies. Finally, in the fifth column, these informal group norms continue to motivate and reinforce individuals' participation in the collective maintenance of the polder infrastructure in the face of ageing infrastructure and land sinking problems.




Fig. 6. A CMLS-style diagram, adapted from Waring et al. (2015), of cultural selection in the Kissimmee River Basin. (+) signifies positive outcomes or events; (-) signifies negative outcomes or events. The shaded cell represents the dominant level of selection or action. In the first column, the negative outcome of flood damage to farmland shifts selection from individual-level hydrological practices (e.g., nothing) to group-level collective action, and a collective preference for channelizing the river emerges in the downstream community. In the second column, selection favors the downstream community’s preference over the upstream community’s preference, and the overall preference, at the federal level, results in channelizing the river. In the third column, wetland degradation, along with norms of environmental conservation, create selection pressures within the upstream community favoring a preference for environmental protection over flood protection. Here, competition clearly occurs between two groups at the community level. In the fourth column, the competition is won by the upstream community; at the federal level, the collective preference is for reversing channelization.

