Works in Progress
Religion's Impact on the Concept of Morality
Along with philosophers Edouard Machery and Stephen Stich, and psychologists Sydney Levine and Joshua Rottman, I'm conducting an X-Phi study examining the effect of religious affiliation on intuitions about which kinds of norms are classified as moral, rather than non-moral. Participants are presented with norms from their own religion and from other religions, and asked to judge the extent to which each counts as a moral norm, rather than, say, a norm of etiquette, or a pragmatic norm. We find that religious affiliation has an important effect on the scope of the moral domain. Some religions (e.g.,Mormonism) strongly increase the range of norms considered moral, while other religions (e.g., Judaism) do not. Still others (e.g., Hinduism) appear to undermine the category of morality itself, as a distinct class of norms.
Along with philosophers Edouard Machery and Stephen Stich, and psychologists Sydney Levine and Joshua Rottman, I'm conducting an X-Phi study examining the effect of religious affiliation on intuitions about which kinds of norms are classified as moral, rather than non-moral. Participants are presented with norms from their own religion and from other religions, and asked to judge the extent to which each counts as a moral norm, rather than, say, a norm of etiquette, or a pragmatic norm. We find that religious affiliation has an important effect on the scope of the moral domain. Some religions (e.g.,Mormonism) strongly increase the range of norms considered moral, while other religions (e.g., Judaism) do not. Still others (e.g., Hinduism) appear to undermine the category of morality itself, as a distinct class of norms.
The Conceptual Problem with Memes
While dual-inheritance theories of cultural evolution are thriving, memetic theories of cultural evolution are not. Despite Dennett's able and ongoing attempts to defend the approach against conceptual or philosophical objections, scientists are not actually developing meme-based models, and the Journal of Memetics closed down in 2005. I argue that the lack of popularity among scientists can be explained by a fundamental conceptual problem, which Dennett has not addressed, concerning ontological parsimony. Appeals to memes make all the same ontological commitments that are made by appeals to dual-inheritance, while also adding further ontological commitments, over and above those made by dual-inheritance theory. These additional commitments, however, do not pay for themselves, empirically speaking; they do not enable us to explain and predict anything that cannot already be explained or predicted by dual-inheritance theory.
While dual-inheritance theories of cultural evolution are thriving, memetic theories of cultural evolution are not. Despite Dennett's able and ongoing attempts to defend the approach against conceptual or philosophical objections, scientists are not actually developing meme-based models, and the Journal of Memetics closed down in 2005. I argue that the lack of popularity among scientists can be explained by a fundamental conceptual problem, which Dennett has not addressed, concerning ontological parsimony. Appeals to memes make all the same ontological commitments that are made by appeals to dual-inheritance, while also adding further ontological commitments, over and above those made by dual-inheritance theory. These additional commitments, however, do not pay for themselves, empirically speaking; they do not enable us to explain and predict anything that cannot already be explained or predicted by dual-inheritance theory.
Normative Motivation and Motivated Reasoning
Along with psychologist Erin Hennes (also in the Building Sustainable Communities cluster at Purdue), I am developing a paper reviewing the role that normative motivations play in motivated cognition. After identifying what specifically normative motivations are, we describe certain special ways in which they function to subconsciously bias reasoning processes.
Along with psychologist Erin Hennes (also in the Building Sustainable Communities cluster at Purdue), I am developing a paper reviewing the role that normative motivations play in motivated cognition. After identifying what specifically normative motivations are, we describe certain special ways in which they function to subconsciously bias reasoning processes.
A Cross-cultural Study of Epistemic Norms
Under supervision of Stephen Stich (Philosophy, Rutgers) and Joseph Henrich (Psychology & Economics, UBC), I managed data collection for the Canadian sample in a cross-cultural study conducted as part of the AHRC Culture and the Mind Project. The other sites involved were in Fiji, Brazil, the Faroe Islands, and the Ukraine. We examined cultural differences in people's normative judgements about the beliefs that others form. In one condition, participants judge a fictional agent on the basis of the strength of the evidence he has for forming a certain belief. In another, the agent is judged on the basis of the practical consequences of adopting that same belief. We find that cultures do indeed differ with regard to the extent to which they are concerned with evidence, as opposed to practical costs and benefits, as the factors justifying other people's beliefs.
Under supervision of Stephen Stich (Philosophy, Rutgers) and Joseph Henrich (Psychology & Economics, UBC), I managed data collection for the Canadian sample in a cross-cultural study conducted as part of the AHRC Culture and the Mind Project. The other sites involved were in Fiji, Brazil, the Faroe Islands, and the Ukraine. We examined cultural differences in people's normative judgements about the beliefs that others form. In one condition, participants judge a fictional agent on the basis of the strength of the evidence he has for forming a certain belief. In another, the agent is judged on the basis of the practical consequences of adopting that same belief. We find that cultures do indeed differ with regard to the extent to which they are concerned with evidence, as opposed to practical costs and benefits, as the factors justifying other people's beliefs.
